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Non-price competition in credit card markets through bundling and bank level 
benefits 
 
 
Abstract 
The attempts to explain the high and sticky credit card rates have given rise to a vast 
literature on credit card markets. This paper endeavors to explain the rates in the 
Turkish market using measures of non-price competition. In this market, issuers 
compete monopolistically by differentiating their credit card products. The fact that 
credit cards and all other banking services are perceived as a bundle by consumers 
allows banks to deploy also bank level characteristics to differentiate their credit 
cards. Thus, credit card rates are expected to be affected by the features and service 
quality of banks. Panel data estimations also control for various costs associated with 
credit card lending. The results show significant and robust effects of the non-price 
competition variables on credit card rates. 
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Non-price competition in credit card markets through bundling bank level 
benefits 
 
1. Introduction 
High and sticky credit card rates that respond asymmetrically to the changes 
in the cost of funds have been frequently cited in the literature.1 During the 2000-
2001 financial crises in Turkey, as a response to soaring short term interest rates, 
banks immediately raised their credit card rates from 107 percent in the last quarter 
of 2000 to 181 percent in the first quarter of 2001. However, in the following 
recovery and stabilization period, although other credit rates smoothly responded to 
falling short term interest rates, credit card rates persistently remained high. 
Graph 1: Credit Card  Rates vs. Other Credit Rates in Turkey 
 
Source: Central Bank of Turkey 
There are 22 credit card issuer banks in Turkey. Even though this number 
should normally suffice to obtain a competitive outcome in a market for relatively 
                                                 
1 Ausubel (1991), Nash and Sinkey (1997), Aysan and Muslim (2006)) 
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homogeneous products, the mounting profitability of the credit card business and 
persistently high credit card rates make the matter of a considerable concern to both 
policymakers and researchers. Our objective, in this regard, is to pinpoint the 
underlying reasons of this apparent lack of competition in the credit card market and 
to propose coherent regulatory policies. 
Explanations abound for the high and sticky spreads between credit card rates 
and funding costs. The primary justification is that the uncollateralized nature of 
credit card loans leads to higher default risk, and consequently to higher interest 
rates. Another is the non-interest bearing grace period between the day of purchase 
and the payment due date. Banks incur a cost in order to finance a customer’s 
purchases during this time. Furthermore, operating a credit card system entails huge 
investments in technology and other infrastructure. Small average balances, on the 
other hand, preclude the cost-effective collection process. Liquidity risk 
management, which is necessitated by the banks’ obligation to be ready to lend up to 
the full amount of the issued credit cards’ limits at any time, also requires costly 
measures. On top of these inherent reasons, banks may also increase their costs by 
trying to differentiate their products through the distribution of benefits such as 
money points and other rewards. By and large, the fact that banks consistently 
preserve their high profitability of their credit card operations despite the fluctuations 
in the above mentioned costs suggests that the inherent costs of the credit card 
business can only partially account for the high and sticky credit card rates (Ausubel 
1991). 
There also exist some more sophisticated explanations. Chakravarti (2003) 
relates credit card rates to the proportion of convenience users to revolvers. As banks 
subsidize convenience users and earn their interest incomes only from revolvers, the 
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higher the ratio of convenience users, the higher the banks’ costs are. Ausubel (1991) 
classifies cardholders according to their rationality and the way they use their credit 
cards. He then postulates that when banks cannot observe the types of cardholders 
they will be reluctant to unilaterally lower their card rates as they will attract only the 
adverse types. Calem and Mester (1995) and Stango (2000, 2002) emphasize 
cardholders’ cost of switching to other banks with lower rates. Mester (1994) and 
Park (2004) argue that sticky rates might be an equilibrium response to banks’ 
asymmetric information about cardholders’ future incomes. Using the Panzar-Rosse 
technique, Shaffer and Thomas (2007) demonstrate that banks have been engaged in 
monopolistic competition in credit card markets and thus obtained monopoly power 
by differentiating their credit cards. 
Shaffer and Thomas’ story certainly holds for the Turkish market. Credit 
cards are by no means homogeneous products. Although there exists no price 
competition in the market (Akin et al. 2009a), banks are actively engaged in fierce 
non-price competition. To acquire market power they differentiate their cards by 
providing an array of card level benefits like travel miles, bonus points, rewards, 
shopping discounts, possibility of paying in installments, and travel and accident 
insurances.   
Our premise is that banks differentiate their cards not only by these card level 
benefits but also by some bank level benefits. Consumers have much more elastic 
demands for vehicle or housing credits, which are quite homogenous products. Thus 
they are more likely to get these loans from banks with lower interest rates. However, 
survey studies2 suggest that consumers inelastically prefer to use the credit cards of 
their primary banks. This may be due to a variety of reasons. Since the amounts 
                                                 
2 A Nationwide Survey on Credit Card Usage (Akin et al. 2009b), Card Monitor (The Interbank Card 
Center 2008).  
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borrowed through credit cards are generally much smaller and of shorter term, 
consumers might not be very sensitive to credit card rates. Another explanation is 
that sometimes banks subtly or overtly bundle credit cards with other bank services. 
For example, they may choose not to facilitate their customers’ payments of credit 
card balances at other banks. They may even intentionally render such monthly 
payments an encumbrance, especially for people who like to use automated payment 
services3. Such behavior may lead consumers to view credit cards and other bank 
services as a bundle, consequently allowing banks to differentiate their cards with the 
features of other banking services and making the quality of a bank’s services in 
general a determinant of credit card rates.  
To test the effect of bank level characteristics on credit card rates, we utilize a 
recently compiled quarterly panel data set for all 22 issuers in the credit card market 
in Turkey which spans the period from the last quarter of 2001 to the second quarter 
of 2006.  When developing the empirical model, we benefit from the bank pricing 
models proposed by Neubergen and Zimmerman (1990) and Hannan (1991). Three 
groups of explanatory variables are used to explain credit card rates. The first group 
encompasses cost variables: the cost of funds, default risk and liquidity risk. In the 
second group, we use the number of bank branches, capital ratio, and average salaries 
to account for the quality of general banking services. We thus capture the effect of 
customers’ perceiving credit cards and other bank services as a bundle. The third 
category includes the credit card market shares of banks, which may affect prices due 
to product differentiation through card level benefits. Fixed effect regressions yield 
significant and robust positive effects of bank characteristics and market share on 
prices in the credit card market in Turkey, confirming that through non-price 
                                                 
3 Taking a vehicle or housing loan from another bank does not pose the same problems. The fixed 
amount of payments for such loans can be more easily followed and made by placing an order for 
automatic periodic payment from an existing bank account. 
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competition, banks are able to charge higher credit card rates. Our results also 
support the hypothesis that credit card rates adjust to the changes in the cost of funds 
sluggishly even after controlling for the non-price features. These results are robust 
to econometric specification and methodology. 
Credit card markets in developed countries have been extensively explored. 
However, very little research has been conducted for developing countries in spite of 
the recent surge in credit card markets in these economies. Among the very few, 
Aysan and Muslim (2006), Aysan and Yildiz (2007) and Akin et al. (2009a) show the 
failure of price competition in the rapidly growing Turkish credit card market. These 
studies reveal that the response of credit card rates to the decline in the cost funds is 
economically insignificant. The current paper is the first to analyze the nature of non-
price competition in credit cards for an emerging market. Analyzing non-price 
competition is important and necessary in order to design and implement effective 
regulations for credit card markets. The Central Bank of Turkey has been applying a 
cap on credit card rates since June 2006 in accordance with the recently enacted 
credit card law. However, the rates still remain exceedingly high compared to other 
loan rates. Tightening of the cap is on the agenda of the government. Any incorrectly 
designed regulation may have economy-wide adverse effects since increasing credit 
card numbers and transaction volumes made credit cards crucial for the functioning 
of the economy in recent years. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, the basic 
features of the Turkish credit card market are described. Empirical and theoretical 
background for the estimations is laid down in Section 3. Section 4 explains the data, 
variables and the empirical model. Results and robustness tests are presented in 
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 7
 
2. The Turkish Credit Card Market 
All issuer banks in Turkey provide credit cards at the national level and 
compete in a large market where the total number of credit cards was 37.3 million as 
of December 2007. The growth performance of the Turkish credit card market in 
2000s is outstanding. The number of credit cards increased almost threefold between 
2000 and 2008. The average growth rate of total outstanding balances between 2003 
and 2007 was 59 percent, whereas the average growth rate of the total transaction 
volume in the same period was 43 percent4.  
A number of factors led credit cards to substitute for traditional payment 
instruments to a considerable extent. In addition to the usual benefits of credit cards5, 
Turkish consumers, who have been living with high inflation for 30 years, especially 
enjoy the non-interest bearing “grace period” between shopping time and payment 
due date. They also benefit from being able to pay in installments without any 
surcharge over the cash prices of goods. Additionally, customers can collect money 
points to be spent like cash, earn travel miles and receive discounts when they use 
their credit cards. Competition among issuers in Turkey has intensified on non-price 
measures in the market. Banks stress the numbers of installments, money points, 
travel miles and similar rewards, but do not emphasize interest rates in their 
advertisements. Co-branding and affinity cards are among the recent popular tools 
for credit card differentiation in Turkey. Co-branded cards with airline companies or 
sea transportation companies that provide frequent traveler miles, and affinity cards 
with soccer clubs are the most common ones. Some smaller issuers also compete by 
                                                 
4  For details, see the periodically published financial stability reports of Central Bank of Republic of 
Turkey (CBRT) and the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA). 
5 Like not having to carry cash, being able to barrow at any time, enjoying the benefits of online 
shopping, etc.  
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offering lower annual fees, teaser rates and switching checks to other issuers’ 
customers, though competition on these features is not fierce in general. 
 An important dimension of the non-price competition through these card 
level benefits in Turkey is the number of the point of sales (POS). Banks are not able 
to offer such benefits if transactions are made through the POS’s of other issuers. 
Thus consumers prefer to have the credit cards of the issuers with large POS 
networks. The market leaders of credit card issuers also have the largest POS 
networks. This puts the smaller banks with smaller POS networks at a considerable 
disadvantage in non-price competition.  
The Turkish credit card market is highly concentrated. The market share of 
the six largest issuers6 is 87 percent in total outstanding balances and 80 percent in 
the number of customers. All issuers in the market provide general banking services. 
Credit cards are only one of their various products. The six largest issuers are also 
among the main players in the deposit and consumer credit markets together with 
three large public banks. They have high numbers of branches, and large ATM and 
POS networks. They compete on these attributes to increase their market shares in 
individual banking.  
3. Background  
Different from the previous literature which highlighted the inherent costs of 
credit card operations, search costs, switch costs, irrationality and asymmetric 
information to account for the high and sticky credit card rates, we bring bundling 
and product differentiation through bank level characteristics to the fore. More 
explicitly, our hypothesis is that to obtain market power in the credit card business, 
banks bundle their credit cards with other bank services and differentiate them 
                                                 
6 The six largest issuers are Yapi Kredi, Garanti, Akbank, Isbank, Finansbank and HSBC. 
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through bank level characteristics. The recent nationwide survey on credit card usage 
(Akin et al. 2009b) bears strong evidence for this hypothesis. The most important 
criterion for credit card choice turned out to be the card being issued by the 
consumer’s primary bank, and the most important reason for having switched to 
another card was found to be switching to another bank. Consumers may perceive 
credit cards and other bank services as a bundle for different reasons. One possible 
explanation is the ease of getting a credit card from a bank at which one already has 
an account. Making one application to a bank for all bank services including credit 
cards rather than making two separate applications for an account and for a credit 
card reduces costs7. Banks may even offer credit cards to their deposit account 
customers. Another justification is that Turkish banks make it more convenient for 
their customers to pay for their own credit cards rather than for cards issued by other 
banks. Making monthly credit card payments from one’s account for the credit card 
of the same bank is easy and can be done on an automated basis for the minimum or 
entire amount due. On the other hand, payments of another bank’s card cannot be 
made on an automated basis from one’s deposit account. Some banks even charge 
fees for money transfers made to pay other banks’ credit card balances. The bundling 
of credit cards and other services are sometimes done explicitly. For example, 
consumer loans are sometimes offered along with a certain amount of credit card 
money points, or with the opportunity of earning more money points in shopping. 
These reasons and others may imply that issuers compete on bundles of products 
rather than just credit cards, making a bank’s services and characteristics an 
important explanatory factor of its credit card rates. Since credit cards are a means of 
either convenient payment or borrowing small amounts of money, the bank’s 
                                                 
7 More precisely, as the credit card revolving balances are generaly of small amounts and short term, 
the intentionally escalated cost of switching to another bank’s  credit card outweigh the perceived 
expected benefit of switching (Akin et al 2009a). 
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characteristics must be influential in describing the bundle. Thus consumers may 
choose credit cards for the same reasons that they choose banks. 
In developing the empirical model we benefit from theoretical and empirical 
studies that examine bank price setting behavior. Hannan (1991) proposes a model to 
examine the pricing of bank loans and deposits in which costs and bank 
characteristics are control variables. Berger and Hannan (1989) and Neubergen and 
Zimmerman (1990) also empirically analyze bank pricing behavior. Neubergen and 
Zimmerman (1990) investigate the reasons of the lower bank deposit rates in 
California and conclude that depositors care not only for prices but also for the 
quality of general banking services, which are proxied by the number of branches, 
average salaries and overhead expenses. 
We assess the effects of non-price competition strategies on credit card rates 
while controlling for the costs of the issuers. We propose that the average credit card 
rate set by an issuer is a function of three types of variables: (i) variables reflecting 
the costs of the issuer, (ii) variables related to the general characteristics of the issuer 
bank, capturing the effects of bundling and product differentiation through card level 
benefits, and (iii) market share, controlling for the level of differentiation through 
card level benefits.  
In the first group, the variables are the cost of funds, the cost of default risk, 
and the cost of liquidity management. We proxy the cost of funds with overnight 
interest rates. Credit cards provide short term loans which are financed through 
expensive short term funds. In that sense, the overnight interest rate is a good 
measure of the cost of funds for credit card issuers. Ausubel (1991) states that the 
cost of funds is the most frequently changing part of the marginal cost for issuers and 
that credit card rates are expected to move together with the changes in the cost of 
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funds. Therefore we expect a positive correlation between credit card rates and 
overnight rates. 
The cost of default is proxied with the delinquency rates measured by the 
ratio of delinquent credit card balances to total outstanding credit card balances. 
However, delinquent loans are given as stock values and include delinquent loans 
from previous periods. What is more important for current credit card rates is the 
flow of delinquent loans, which can be measured by the first difference of 
delinquency rates. Delinquency rates affect prices through two different channels: by 
increasing issuer specific costs and by increasing switching costs. Firstly, since banks 
have to keep provision for delinquent loans, higher delinquency rates are associated 
with higher costs and hence higher prices. In that sense, Stango (2000) includes 
defaults per outstanding balances as a control variable in the credit card interest 
margin equations. In addition, higher delinquency rates increase the captivity of 
customers since delinquencies worsen the credit history of consumers and decrease 
their chances of getting lower rate cards. Both of these channels affect the prices in 
the same direction; hence, we predict a positive coefficient on this variable. 
However, an endogeneity issue arises if we include delinquency rates on the right 
hand side. An increase in credit card rates increases the expected future interest 
burden for credit card borrowers and hence increases the probability of default. We 
use the lag of the first difference of delinquency rates to alleviate the potential 
endogeneity problem, as Stango (2000) suggests. 
The liquidity risk issue in the credit card markets was first raised by Shaffer 
and Thomas (2007). Unlike other loans, banks commit to lend up to a certain amount 
when issuing credit cards. The full utilization of this amount is solely at the 
discretion of cardholders. Therefore, banks have to be prepared to lend the amount 
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equal to the difference between total credit card limits and outstanding balances. This 
additional amount necessitates holding excess cash reserves and/or liquid securities, 
or borrowing short term loans. The opportunity costs arising from keeping low-yield 
short term reserves or the direct cost of relying on expensive short term borrowing 
comprise an important component of the total cost of credit card issuing. We capture 
the cost of liquidity management with the ratio of credit card limits to total assets and 
expect a positive coefficient on this variable. 
In the second group, we include explanatory variables to capture general bank 
characteristics. A variable commonly included in bank pricing equations is the 
number of bank branches. Banks strategically invest in branches to expand their 
network and to reach more customers. The convenience of an extended branch 
network may compensate for higher credit card rates for consumers. Hence we 
predict a positive coefficient for this variable. As argued by Neubergen and 
Zimmerman (1990), the number of branches may not fully capture the services 
provided to the customers of a bank. Banks differentiate themselves by providing 
free or underpriced services and better service quality. For example, some banks 
offer higher security in online banking and POS payment systems to their customers 
and provide conveniences for paying credit card debts. It is difficult to measure all 
these different aspects of services; however, an extra service is expected to increase 
operating costs. Thus, the cost of services may be used as a measure of the number 
and quality of services. Average salaries paid by banks are used to capture the cost of 
services. The average salary variable is included both by Berger and Hannan (1989) 
and Neubergen and Zimmerman (1990). Average salary is a proxy for the quality of 
general bank services. If a competitive bank pays higher than average salaries, its 
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employees are expected to provide better services in general, including better 
customer relations. Hence, we expect positive coefficients for these variables. 
The soundness of a bank also matters for bank choice. Especially in Turkey 
we expect the strength of a bank to be crucial in bank choice because of the 
experience of bank failures in recent history during which tens of thousands of 
depositors lost their savings in whole or in part. As a proxy for the general health of 
the bank the ratio of owners’ equity to total assets (capital ratio) is used and a 
positive effect of this variable on credit card rates is expected. 
In the third group, we include a proxy for the banks’ market power owing to 
their product differentiation efforts through card level benefits. Since there is very 
limited data on such measures as advertisement or promotional expenditures, we use 
market share, which is highly correlated with these, as a proxy. As in the previous 
theoretical and empirical studies on monopolistic competition, we predict a positive 
coefficient for the market share variable in our estimations8. Endogeneity is 
obviously a concern with this specification, as market shares will be affected by 
interest rates. However endogeneity will bias the relation in the opposite direction, 
i.e., higher credit card rates will imply lower market shares. To mitigate the potential 
endogeneity problem between current rates and current market shares, we follow 
Stango (2002) and use the lag of the market share variable. 
4. The Empirical Model and Data 
Our benchmark model capturing the effects of a number of variables on the 
equilibrium distribution of credit card rates is: 
                                                 
8 Switching cost literature (Stango 2000, 2002) also suggests the same result. Firms with larger captive 
customer bases may lean toward keeping their prices high in order to exploit them, foregoing gaining 
new customers with low prices. 
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A quarterly data set covering of all 22 credit card issuers in Turkey is used to 
estimate this equation. We cover the post-crisis period from the last quarter of 2001 
to the second quarter of 2006 after which the Central Bank started to set a cap on 
credit card rates. Due to some missing data points, some observations are dropped to 
keep the number of observations constant across various specifications. Table A1 in 
the Appendix presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
estimations9. Table A2 in the Appendix presents the correlations between these 
variables. 
The dependent variable in the empirical model is the credit card rates of 
issuers (ratebp).10 The explanatory variables in the model are the lag of opportunity 
cost of funds (costbp.L1), the lagged and differenced credit card delinquency rates 
(delqrate.LD), credit card limits as a ratio of total assets (cclimitsA), the number of a 
bank’s branches (branch), average quarterly cost per employee (avgsal), owners’ 
equity as a ratio of total assets (capitalr), and the market shares of issuers in the 
credit card market lagged by one period (marketshare.L1). We also include a trend 
variable (trend) and bank dummies in the regressions.  
The overnight borrowing rate of the previous quarter is used as a proxy for 
the cost of funds. Credit card delinquency rate is the ratio of the average quarterly 
delinquent loans to the average quarterly outstanding credit card balances. Average 
salary is calculated by dividing the total quarterly personnel expenses to the average 
number of employees in that quarter. Outstanding credit card balances are used as a 
                                                 
9 Credit card rates and the cost of funds are expressed as basis points, which are the average monthly 
rates for each quarter.  
10 Banks charge different interest rates on their different cards. Credit card rates in our study are 
weighted averages of all these different interest rates charged by an issuer. These rates are collected by 
the BRSA. 
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proxy for the market shares of the issuers. Credit card balances and delinquent credit 
card loans data are obtained from the Central Bank of Turkey. Other balance sheet 
items of the issuer banks and the numbers of bank branches and employees are 
collected from the database of the Banks Association of Turkey.  
We estimate our model using fixed effects panel data regression in which the 
individual effects are likely to be correlated with the explanatory variables. The 
Hausman test provides support for using this specification.11  
5. Estimation Results 
Table 1 presents the results of the fixed effects regressions. Our benchmark 
specification is given in the first column. All explanatory variables in this 
specification except for the delinquency rate are significant at 5% level with the 
expected signs. The highly significant and negative coefficient of the trend variable 
indicates a prominent downward trend in credit card rates during the recent years. 
The coefficient on the cost of funds is 0.48 and indicates that a 10 percent decrease in 
the cost of funds leads to a 4.8 percent decrease in the average credit card rates even 
after controlling for the other variables pertaining to the credit card market. The 
estimated coefficient indicates that the impact of the changes in the cost of funds on 
credit card rates is not substantial. Under the assumption of perfect competition, 
Ausubel expects this coefficient to be close to one. The sluggish adjustment of credit 
card rates to the cost of funds indicates the lack of price competition in the market. 
 The delinquency rate variable, another cost measure, turns out to be 
insignificant. This result is not surprising for the Turkish credit card market. Given 
the extremely high credit card interest margins, changes in the default risk did not 
constitute an essential factor in banks’ pricing decisions. Until the regulation in 2006, 
                                                 
11 See Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
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banks in Turkey extended their credit card customer bases heedless of the default 
risks. They acquired high risk customers by distributing credit cards on the streets or 
at universities without asking for guarantors or examining consumers’ income status 
while they were more prudent in giving other consumer credits.  
Table 1: Estimation Results (Fixed Effects) 
Notes: 1. (***), (**) and (*) indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
2. t statistics are provided in parentheses. 
3. Credit card rates and the cost of funds are expressed as basis points. 
 
Estimation results indicate that liquidity management costs have a positive 
and significant effect on credit card rates. However, the effect of this variable on 
credit card rates is not as large as suggested by Shaffer and Thomas (2007) in 
Dependent 
Variable: ratebp 
Benchmark 
Specification 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
costbp.L1 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.53*** 
  (4.16) (4.31) (4.26) (4.36) (4.53) 
delqrate.LD 0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
  (0.08) (0.06) (-0.01) (-0.01) (0.01) 
cclimitsA 1.53*** 1.55*** 1.55*** 1.56*** 1.41** 
  (2.75) (2.74) (2.75) (2.75) (2.56) 
branch 0.38** 0.36** 0.37** 0.36** 0.36** 
  (2.22) (2.13) (2.19) (2.11) (2.40) 
avgsal 15.55*** 16.17*** 15.68*** 16.22*** 15.30*** 
  (3.13) (3.46) (3.16) (3.46) (3.33) 
capitalr 3.16*** 3.10*** 3.29*** 3.21***   
  (3.35) (3.36) (3.54) (3.47)   
marketshare.L1 6.24** 6.45** 6.22** 6.41** 8.76*** 
  (2.04) (2.11) (2.03) (2.09) (2.94) 
trend -16.20*** -16.43*** -16.05*** -16.28*** -15.83*** 
  (-5.00) (-5.03) (-4.97) (-4.98) (-4.94) 
offbsA  0.02  0.02  
   (0.46)  (0.41)  
netprofitA   0.86 0.72  
    (0.43) (0.36)  
overheadA     8.61*** 
     (3.27) 
constant 358.19*** 352.13*** 352.05*** 347.63*** 372.38*** 
  (5.07) (5.19) (5.04) (5.12) (5.67) 
       
Number of obs. 328 328 328 328 302 
R-squared  0.8456 0.8457 0.8457 0.8457 0.8420 
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Turkey. A one percentage point increase in the liquidity risk measure increases the 
average credit card interest rate by 1.5 basis points.  
The next three variables capture the effect of bundling on credit card rates. 
The coefficient of the number of bank branches variable is significant at 5% level 
and it indicates that if a bank has 100 more branches, consumers accept 38 basis 
points higher interest rates. This effect is substantial considering the large differences 
in the number of branches between big and small banks in Turkey. In our data set, 
one of the banks has over 1000 branches, three banks have between 500 and 1000 
branches, eleven banks have between 100 and 499 branches, and seven banks have 
less than 100 branches. The significant and positive coefficient of the average salary 
variable also reflects the importance of general banking services in credit card 
choice. This variable takes the highest coefficient among the explanatory variables. 
Results indicate that if the average quarterly salary increases by TL 1,000, the bank 
charges a 16 basis points higher credit card interest rate. Capital ratio enters the 
benchmark equation with a highly significant and positive coefficient, indicating the 
importance of the soundness of a bank. The coefficient of this variable shows that 
consumers are willing to pay a 3.16 basis points higher interest rate on average when 
a bank has a one percentage point higher capital ratio. The results for these three 
variables show that bank characteristics are  important determinants of credit card 
rates. 
The positive and significant (at 5% level) coefficient of the lagged market 
share variable reveals that the negative endogeneity bias actually reinforces our 
hypothesis, and thus should not be a serious concern. The result implies that a one 
percentage point increase in market share enables the issuer to charge a 6 basis points 
higher credit card rate. Given the differences of market shares of large and small 
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issuers, the effect of market share on credit card rates can be quite high. The largest 
firm in the market is about 11,150 times larger than the smallest firm in terms of 
outstanding balances. This finding also confirms the expectations of the switching 
cost models, indicating that banks with larger market shares exploit their captive 
customers by applying higher credit card rates. 
The pricing strategies of public banks, on the other hand, may differ from 
those of private banks due to the differences in their priorities. Public banks may 
price more in favor of consumers because of their social welfare concerns. Graph 2 
gives the distribution of issuer-specific fixed effects for 22 banks in the benchmark 
model. The bank with the lowest fixed effect coefficient is a public bank. The second 
lowest coefficient belongs to a private bank which is run like a public bank due to its 
ownership structure. Two other public banks have the sixth and eighth lowest fixed 
effect coefficients. These findings indicate that after controlling for costs and product 
differentiation, public banks price more in favor of consumers compared to private 
banks.  
Graph 2: Distribution of Fixed Effect Coefficients for Model I 
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In order to check the robustness of our results, other related explanatory 
variables are added to the benchmark specification (Model I). First, the ratio of off-
balance sheet items to total assets (offbsA) is included in Model II in Table 1. Off-
balance sheet items basically contain credit commitments and derivative instruments. 
This variable reflects the technology level and product diversity of a bank. In that 
sense, it may affect credit card rates positively through the bundling effect. However, 
the coefficient of this variable turns out to be insignificant. Signs and significances of 
the other explanatory variables are not altered much when we add the offbsA variable 
to the estimations. 
Secondly, in Model III, the ratio of net profits to total assets (netprofitA) is 
added to the benchmark specification. This ratio can be considered as an additional 
measure of the soundness of a bank like capital ratio. Therefore a positive coefficient 
is expected for this variable. In Model IV, both offbsA and netprofitA are used. 
Again, signs and significances of other explanatory variables do not change. 
However, the coefficient of netprofitA variable is not significantly different from 
zero. 
Another control variable used to check the robustness of the estimations is the 
ratio of overhead expenses to total assets (overheadA). This variable is used by 
Neubergen and Zimmerman (1991) in addition to the average salary variable to 
proxy the quality of banking services. A significant positive coefficient is found for 
this variable as expected in Model V. The signs and significances of the variables in 
the benchmark specification do not change.12 These experiments confirm that the 
results are robust to different specifications.  
                                                 
12 We drop the capital ratio variable in this regression due to the high correlation of this variable with 
overheadA. 
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We also checked the appropriateness of the econometric model used in the 
estimations. The Hausman test reveals that the fixed effects estimation is consistent 
and efficient while the random effects estimation is not. Hence, the choice of the 
fixed effects regression specification is justified.  
6. Conclusion 
In this study, the sources of the apparent lack of competition in the Turkish 
credit card market, or equivalently of the card issuer banks’ market powers are 
analyzed. It is concluded that to acquire market power banks bundle their cards with 
other banking services and differentiate them by providing a number of non-price 
benefits to their credit card customers. The general quality of banking services and 
bank characteristics are important for card choice since many cardholders use other 
services of the issuer bank as well, causing them to view all of these services as a 
product bundle. Some other ways of differentiating credit cards are distributing 
money points, travel miles and similar benefits, enabling consumers to pay shopping 
bills in installments and offering discounts to cardholders.  
An empirical model is estimated to examine the effect of measures of non-
price competition on credit card rates. A quarterly panel data set for all 22 issuers in 
the credit card market in Turkey, spanning the period from the last quarter of 2001 to 
the second quarter of 2006, is used. We benefit from the bank pricing models in the 
literature to build the empirical model. We control for the costs of funds, default risk 
and liquidity risk management in credit card operations. The number of bank 
branches, average salaries and capital ratio are used as proxies for the quality of 
general banking services. The effect of differentiation through card level benefits is 
captured with the market shares of the issuers. Fixed regressions show that non-price 
competition has an important effect on credit card rates in Turkey. 
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This paper is the first to study the role of non-price competition in the credit 
card market of an emerging market economy. The results indicate that efforts 
concentrated on non-price competition by financial market regulators will help 
enhance competition in credit card markets. Market power obtained by product 
differentiation does not generally warrant regulation and can even be welfare-
improving. However, bundling is to the detriment of consumers, and regulators 
should devise policies to refrain banks from this kind of competition. Such 
regulations can be softer and less problematic than interest rate regulations. For 
example, consumers can simply be allowed to place orders for automatic payments 
of their credit card balances at other banks from their accounts. This will certainly 
make it easier for consumers to adopt the credit cards of other banks with better 
conditions and lower interest rates, without being obliged to change their banks. 
Moreover, to improve the competition a la product differentiation through card level 
benefits, large banks can be forced to share their POS networks in such a way that 
small issuers can also offer such benefits to their customers. 
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7. Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Observations for each variable    
N (overall) 
N (between) 
T –bar (within)   
328 
22 
14.91     
Variable    Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. 
value 
Max. 
value   
ratebp overall  626.61 141.86 275 995  
  between    82.71 504.69 841.94  
  within    116.57 320.67 955.43  
           
costbp.L1 overall  226.85 109.92 112.50 479.90  
  between    35.17 155.70 264.15  
  within    105.24 81.86 460.29  
        
delqrate.LD overall  0.15 10.13 -163.65 44.48  
  between    3.38 -12.05 8.88  
  within    9.71 -151.44 49.51  
           
cclimitsA overall  12.66 15.66 0.43 83.99  
  between    15.23 1.13 59.56  
  within    6.21 -16.73 38.77  
           
branch overall  290.55 303.53 8 1176  
  between    298.74 9 1151.94  
  within    22.44 225.14 432.49  
        
avgsal overall  9.54 2.34 4.73 16.43  
  between    1.98 7.11 14.88  
  within    1.35 6.63 14.76  
           
capitalr overall  13.01 5.33 2.38 59.35  
  between    3.95 7.69 20.43  
  within    3.83 -2.19 51.92  
           
marketshare.L1 overall  5.10 6.93 0 28.29  
  between    6.72 0.01 24.17  
  within    0.94 1.84 9.22  
           
offbsA overall  196.54 144.78 7.29 809.77  
  between    111.21 44.95 527.51  
  within    90.03 -226.85 525.65  
           
netprofitA overall  0.81 2.14 -17.61 5.85  
  between    1.43 -4.91 2.10  
  within    1.69 -11.89 7.77   
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Table A2: Pairwise Correlations 
  ratebp costbp.L1 delqrate.LD cclimitsA branch avgsal capitalr markshare.L1 trend offbsA netprofitA 
ratebp 1           
costbp.L1 0.75* 1          
delqrate.LD -0.04 -0.08 1         
cclimitsA 0.23* -0.07 0.03 1        
branch -0.14* 0.08 0 -0.15* 1       
avgsal -0.26* -0.50* -0.01 0.41* -0.20* 1      
capitalr 0.09* -0.04 -0.09* 0.33* -0.11* 0.31* 1     
marketshare.L1 0.13* 0.10* -0.01 0.22* 0.38* 0.03 0 1    
trend -0.75* -0.96* 0.09* 0.04 -0.06 0.52* -0.01 -0.09 1   
offbsA -0.07 -0.38 0.04 0.43* -0.26* 0.46* 0.15* 0.07 0.38* 1  
netprofitA 0.03 0 0.36* 0.12* 0.13* -0.20* -0.29* -0.03 0 0.10* 1 
 (*) Indicates significance at 10% level 
 
 24
8. References 
Ausubel, L.M. (1991). “The failure of competition in the credit card market”, 
American Economic Review, 81: 50-81. 
Akin, G. G., A. F. Aysan, G. I. Kara and L. Yildiran (2009a), “The failure of price 
competition in the Turkish credit card market,” mimeo, Bogazici University 
Akin, G. G., A. F. Aysan, G. I. Kara and L. Yildiran (2009b), “A Nationwide Survey 
on Credit Card Usage,” mimeo, Bogazici University 
Aysan, A. F., and N. A. Müslim (2006). “Assessing the Competition in the Credit 
Card Market in Turkey: A New Empirical Evidence”, International Management 
Development Research Yearbook, K. Erdener & H. Talha (eds.), Vol.15, 
International Management Development Press, Hummelstown, Pennsylvania, USA. 
Aysan, A.F., and L.Yildiz (2007).“The Regulation of the Credit Card Market in 
Turkey,”The International Research Journal of Finance and Economics, 2(11) 
Berger, Allen and Timothy Hannan (1989). "The Price-Concentration Relationship in 
Banking,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 71:291-99. 
Calem, Paul S. and Loretta J. Mester (1995). “Consumer Behavior and the Stickiness 
of Credit-Card Interest Rates,” The American Economic Review, 85(9):1327-1336. 
Hannan, Timothy (1991). “Foundations of the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
Paradigm in Banking”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 23(1):68-84. 
Interbank Card Center (2008). Card Monitor. 
Mester, L.J. (1994). “Why are credit card rates sticky?” Economic Theory, 4, 505-30 
Nash, R.C and J.F.Sinkey (1997). “On competition, risk and hidden assets in the 
market for bank credit cards” Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, 89-112  
Neubergen, J. A. and Zimmerman, G. C. (1991). “Bank pricing of retail deposit 
accounts and the California rate mystery,” Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco. 
Park, S. (2004). “Consumer rationality and credit card pricing: an explanation based 
on the option value of credit cards lines” Managerial and Decision Economics, 25,  
Shaffer, S. and L. Thomas (2007). “A Reassessment of Market Power Among Credit 
Card Banks”, Applied Financial Economics, 17:755-767. 
Stango, V. (2000). “Competition and Pricing in the Credit Card Market”, The Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 82(3): 499-508. 
Stango, V. (2002). “Pricing with Consumer Switching Costs: Evidence from the 
Credit Card Market”, Journal of Industrial Economics, December. 
